Abstract. Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai, and Pointcheval [1] recently proposed a new security requirement of the encryption schemes called "keyprivacy." It asks that the encryption provide (in addition to privacy of the data being encrypted) privacy of the key under which the encryption was performed. Incidentally, Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman [2] recently proposed the notion of ring signature, which allows a member of an ad hoc collection of users S to prove that a message is authenticated by a member of S without revealing which member actually produced the signature. We are concerned with an underlying primitive element common to the key-privacy encryption and the ring signature schemes, that is, families of trap-door permutations with a common domain. For a standard RSA family of trap-door permutations, even if all of the functions in a family use RSA moduli of the same size (the same number of bits), it will have domains with different sizes. In this paper, we construct an RSA family of trap-door permutations with a common domain, and propose the applications of our construction to the key-privacy encryption and ring signature schemes, which have some advantage to the previous schemes.
Introduction
Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai, and Pointcheval [1] recently proposed a new security requirement of the encryption schemes called "key-privacy." It asks that the encryption provide (in addition to privacy of the data being encrypted) privacy of the key under which the encryption was performed. The standard RSA encryption does not provide key-privacy. Since even if two public keys N 0 and N 1 (N 0 < N 1 ) are the same bits, N 1 − N 0 may be large. In [1] , they provided the key-privacy encryption scheme, RSA-RAEP, which is a variant of RSA-OAEP (Bellare and Rogaway [3] , Fujisaki, Okamoto, Pointcheval, and Stern [4] ), and solved this problem by repeating the evaluation of the RSA-OAEP permutation f (x, r) with plaintext x and random r, each time using different r until the value is in the safe range (See section 3.2.). For deriving a value in the safe range, the number of the repetition would be very large (the value of the security parameter).
Incidentally, Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman [2] recently proposed the notion of ring signature, which allows a member of an ad hoc collection of users S to prove that a message is authenticated by a member of S without revealing which member actually produced the signature. Unlike group signature, ring signature has no group managers, no setup procedures, no revocation procedures, and no coordination. The signer does not need the knowledge, consent, or assistance of the other ring members to put them in the ring. All the signer needs is knowledge of their regular public keys. They also proposed the efficient schemes based on RSA and Rabin. In their RSA-based scheme, the trap-door RSA permutations of the various ring members will have domains of different sizes. This makes it awkward to combine the individual signatures, so one should construct some trap-door one-way permutation which has a common domain for each user. Intuitively, in the ring signature scheme, Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman solved this by encoding the message to an N i -ary representation and applying a standard permutation f to the low-order digits (See section 4.2.). As mentioned in [2] , for deriving a secure permutation g with a common domain, the domain of g would be 160 bits larger than that of f .
In this paper, we will take a different approach. We use neither the repetition of evaluation of a permutation nor an N i -ary representation. We are concerned with an underlying primitive element common to the key-privacy encryption and the ring signature schemes, that is, families of trap-door permutations with a common domain. For a standard RSA family of trap-door permutations denoted by RSA, even if all of the functions in a family use RSA moduli of the same size (the same number of bits), it will have domains with different sizes. We construct an RSA family of trap-door permutations with a common domain denoted by RSACD, and prove that the θ-partial one-wayness of RSACD is equivalent to the one-wayness of RSACD for θ > 0.5, and that the one-wayness of RSACD is equivalent to the one-wayness of RSA. Fujisaki, Okamoto, Pointcheval, and Stern [4] showed that the θ-partial one-wayness of RSA is equivalent to the one-wayness of RSA for θ > 0.5. Thus, the following relations are satisfied for θ > 0.5.
RSA is θ-partial one-way
RSACD is θ-partial one-way
RSA is one-way
We then propose the application to the key-privacy encryption scheme. Our proposed scheme is more efficient than the previous scheme with respect to the number of exponentiations for encryption in the worst case. When we use the RSA moduli which is uniformly distributed in (2 k−1 , 2 k ), the expected number of our scheme is the same as that of RSA-RAEP. In our scheme, the number of exponentiations for encryption is at most two, while in RSA-RAEP, the upper bound of this number is k 1 ( 2, security parameter).
We also propose the application to the ring signature scheme. We consider the case that the members of the same group use the RSA moduli of the same length. In our scheme, the domain of trap-door one-way permutation to sign and verify a ring signature is {0, 1} k , while that of the previous scheme is {0, 1} k+160 , where k is the length of the RSA moduli. Thus, we can reduce the size of signature in this situation.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, after reviewing the definitions of families of functions and the standard RSA family, we propose the RSA family of trap-door permutations with a common domain. We also prove that the θ-partial one-wayness of RSACD is equivalent to the one-wayness of RSACD for θ > 0.5, and that the one-wayness of RSACD is equivalent to the one-wayness of RSA. In Section 3, we propose the application of our new family to the key-privacy encryption scheme. In Section 4, we propose the application of our new family to the ring signature scheme. We conclude in Section 5.
2 An RSA Family of Trap-door Permutations with a Common Domain
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review the definitions of families of functions, and the standard RSA family of trap-door permutations denoted by RSA.
Definition 1 (families of functions [1] 
We define the advantages of the adversary via
where the probability is taken over (pk, sk) [4] showed that the θ-partial onewayness of RSA is equivalent to the one-wayness of RSA for θ > 0.5.
The Construction of RSACD
In this section, we propose the RSA family of trap-door permutations with a common domain denoted by RSACD. 
The choice of N from (2 k−1 , 2 k ) ensures that all elements in Dom RSACD (N, e, k) are permuted by the RSA function at least once.
Properties of RSACD
In this section, we prove that the θ-partial one-wayness of RSACD is equivalent to the one-wayness of RSACD for θ > 0.5, and that the one-wayness of RSACD is equivalent to the one-wayness of RSA. Theorem 1. Let A be an algorithm that outputs the k − k 0 most significant bits of the pre-image of its input y ∈ Rng RSACD (N, e, k) for
, with success probability = Adv 
To prove this theorem, we use the following lemma proved in [4] . (N, e, k) , then we analyze this algorithm and evaluate the success probability and the running time of B.
Lemma 1 ([4]). Consider an equation αt
,k (y), (x, y) satisfies one of the following equations.
(
We say type(y) = 1 (respectively type(y) = 2) if (x, y) satisfies equation 1 (resp. equation 2).
After step 1, if B does not output fail, then y is uniformly distributed over Rng RSACD (N, e, k), and for y and x = g N,d,k (y ), (x , y ) satisfies one of the following equations.
We say type(y ) = 1 (respectively type(y ) = 2) if (x , y ) satisfies equation 1 (resp. equation 2 ).
After step 2, if A outputs correctly, namely, z is the k − k 0 most significant bits of x and z is the k − k 0 most significant bits of x , then x = z · 2 k 0 + r and 
Now, we analyze the success probability. We define the following events: 
We estimate the running time of B. B runs A twice. B can solve αr
Theorem 2. If RSA is one-way, then RSACD is one-way.
Proof. We prove that if there exists a polynomial-time inverting algorithm A for RSACD with non-negligible probability = Adv 1−pow−fnc RSACD,A (k), then there exists a polynomial-time inverting algorithm D for RSA with non-negligible probability = Adv
We specify the algorithm D to compute a pre-image of Y ∈ Rng RSA (N, e, k) . Figure 1) . Therefore,
where
Furthermore, we have Pr
where Y is uniformly distributed over Z * N and y is uniformly distributed over Rng RSACD (N, e, k), since
Therefore,
It is clear that if RSACD is one-way then RSA is one-way. Thus, the one-wayness of RSACD is equivalent to the one-wayness of RSA.
Definitions of Key-Privacy
The classical security requirements of an encryption scheme, for example indistinguishability or non-malleability under the chosen-ciphertext attack, provide privacy of the encryption data. In [1] , Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai, and Pointcheval proposed a new security requirement of encryption schemes called "key-privacy." It asks that the encryption provide (in addition to privacy of the data being encrypted) privacy of the key under which the encryption was performed.
In a heterogeneous public-key environment, encryption will probably fail to be anonymous for trivial reasons. For example, different users might be using different cryptosystems, or, if the same cryptosystem, have keys of different lengths. In [1] , a public-key encryption scheme with common-key generation is described as follows.
Definition 6. A public-key encryption scheme with common-key generation PE = (G, K, E, D) consists of four algorithms.
-The common-key generation algorithm G takes as input some security parameter k and returns some common key I.
-The key generation algorithm K is a randomized algorithm that takes as input the common key I and returns a pair (pk, sk) of keys, the public key and a matching secret key. -The encryption algorithm E is a randomized algorithm that takes the public key pk and a plaintext x to return a ciphertext y. -The decryption algorithm D is a deterministic algorithm that takes the secret key sk and a ciphertext y to return the corresponding plaintext x or a special symbol ⊥ to indicate that the ciphertext was invalid.
In [1] , they formalized the property of "key-privacy." This can be considered under either the chosen-plaintext attack or the chosen-ciphertext attack, yielding two notions of security, IK-CPA and IK-CCA. (IK means "indistinguishability of keys".) The "time-complexity" is the worst-case execution time of the experiment plus the size of the code of the adversary, in some fixed RAM model of computation.
Above it is mandated that

RSA-RAEP by Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai, and Pointcheval
A simple observation that seems to be folklore is that standard RSA encryption does not provide key-privacy, even when all moduli in the system have the same length. Suppose an adversary knows that the ciphertext y is created under one of two keys (N 0 , e 0 ) or (N 1 , e 1 ), and suppose N 0 ≤ N 1 . If y ≥ N 0 then the adversary bets it was created under (N 1 , e 1 ), else it bets it was created under (N 0 , e 0 ). It is not hard to see that this attack has non-negligible advantage.
In [1] , they proposed an RSA-based encryption scheme which is secure in the sense of IK-CCA. It is RSA-RAEP which is a variant of RSA-OAEP. Since their variant chooses N from (2 k−2 , 2 k ), it simply repeats the ciphertext computation, each time using new coins, until the ciphertext y satisfies y < 2 k−2 . 
Definition 8 (RSA-RAEP [1]). RSA-RAEP = (G, K, E, D) is as follows. The common-key generation algorithm G takes a security parameter k and returns parameters
They proved RSA-RAEP is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2 and IK-CCA in the random oracle model assuming RSA is one-way. In RSA-RAEP, the expected number of exponentiations for encryption is
, the expected number of this scheme is two. However, the upper bound of the number of exponentiations for encryption is k 1 ( 2, security parameter).
Our Proposed Encryption Scheme
In this section, we propose our encryption scheme, which uses RSACD instead of RSA. 
Using Theorem 1 and 2, we can prove the following theorem. N,e,k and g N,d ,k , and the domain of valid signature change, we can prove in a similar way that our scheme is secure in the sense of IK-CCA in the random oracle model assuming RSACD is partial one-way.
Therefore, by Theorem 1 and 2, we can prove that our scheme is secure in the sense of IND-CCA2 and IK-CCA under the assumption that RSA is one-way.
In this scheme, the expected number of exponentiations in encryption is
Suppose that N is uniformly distributed in (2 k−1 , 2 k ), the expected number of our scheme is two, the same as RSA-RAEP. In our scheme, the number of exponentiations for encryption is at most two, while in RSA-RAEP, the upper bound of this number is k 1 ( 2, security parameter). Notice that we use the randomness only for an RSA-OAEP.
Application to Ring Signature
Definitions of Ring Signature
In [2] , Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman proposed the notion of ring signature, which allows a member of an ad hoc collection of users S to prove that a message is authenticated by a member of S without revealing which member actually produced the signature. Unlike group signature, ring signature has no group managers, no setup procedures, no revocation procedures, and no coordination.
Definition 10 (Ring Signature [2] The signer does not need the knowledge, consent, or assistance of the other ring members to put them in the ring. All he needs is knowledge of their regular public keys. Verification must satisfy the usual soundness and completeness conditions, but in addition the signature scheme must satisfy "signer-ambiguous", which is the property that the verifier should be unable to determine the identity of the actual signer with probability greater than 1/r + , where r is the size of the ring, and is negligible.
RSA-based Ring Signature Scheme by Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman
In [2] , they constructed ring signature schemes in which all the ring member use RSA as their individual signature schemes. We review their scheme.
Let , k, and b be security parameters. Let E be a symmetric encryption scheme over {0, 1} b using -bit keys and h be a hash function which maps arbitrary strings to -bit strings. They use h to make a key for E. They assume that each user has an RSA public key P i = (N i , e i ) which specifies the trap-door one-way permutation f i on Z N i : f i (x) = x e mod N i . To sign and verify a ring signature, they proposed a combining function C k,v based on a symmetric encryption scheme E modeled by a (keyed) random permutation
where v is an initialization value. In their scheme, the inputs y i to the combining function are computed as g i (x i ) for some x i ∈ {0, 1} b . They defined the extended trap-door permutation g i over {0, 1}
b which has a common domain for each user as follows: for any b-bit input x i define nonnegative integers q i and r i so that
If b is sufficiently large (e.g. 160 bits larger than any of the N i ), g i is a one-way trap-door permutation. (See also [5] .) A ring signature on a message m consists in a tuple (v, x 1 , · · · , x r ) and the signature is valid iff C h(m),v (g 1 (x 1 ), · · · , g r (x r )) = v. For any message m, any fixed values v and {x i } i =s , one can efficiently compute the value y s such that the combining function outputs v by using the following equation:
Now using her knowledge of the trap-door for function f s , s-th member (the actual signer) is able to compute x s such that g s (x s ) = y s . Thus, the ring member can generate a valid signature. Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman proved this scheme is unconditionally signer-ambiguous and provably secure in the random oracle model assuming RSA is one-way.
Our Proposed Ring Signature Scheme
Unlike group signature, ring signature has no group managers, no setup procedures, no revocation procedures, and no coordination, and each user can use a public key whose length is different from other users.
In [2] , Rivest, Shamir, and Tauman mentioned the case that a member of the cabinet of some country wished to leak her secret to a journalist. In this kind of situation, it was reasonable to consider that the members of the same group use the RSA moduli of the same length. In our scheme, we assume the situation that each user chooses her public key with the same size.
Our scheme is almost the same as the previous scheme. The difference is using f N i ,e,k (·) in Section 2.2 instead of g i (·) in Section 4.2. Then, the domain of f N,e,k (·) is {0, 1} k , while that of the previous scheme is {0, 1} k+160 , where k is the length of the RSA moduli. Thus, we can reduce the size of signature in this situation. In particular, the size of signature of our scheme is 160 bits smaller than that of the previous scheme in order to archive security parameter k = 1024. In our scheme, the number of exponentiations is one or two, while that of the original scheme in [2] is one. Since f Ni,e,k (·) is a trap-door one-way permutation as well as g i (·), we can easily prove the following theorem in a similar way as for the previous scheme.
Theorem 4. Our scheme is unconditionally signer-ambiguous and provably secure in the random oracle model assuming RSA is one-way.
We can also apply this scheme to the Rabin-based ring signature scheme in [2] in a similar way.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have constructed the RSA family of trap-door permutations with a common domain and proposed the applications of our construction to the key-privacy encryption and ring signature schemes, which have some advantage to the previous schemes. It might be interesting to consider other applications of our RSA family, and different constructions of a family of trap-door permutations with a common domain.
